Captain Barré Latter and British Engagement with Sikkim
during the 1814-1816 Nepal War

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The 1814-1816 war between the East India Company and Nepal led to the first substantive British engagement with the kingdom of Sikkim. The outcomes of the war included the 1816 Treaty of Segauli, which served to define the boundaries of the modern state of Nepal, as well as the 1817 Treaty of Titalia which formally incorporated Sikkim within the diplomatic orbit of British India. The conflict also had important—albeit less significant—repercussions on British relations with Tibet and China.

British policy was formulated in Calcutta by the Governor-General, Francis Rawdon Hastings (1754-1826), who was then known as Lord Moira and from 1817 became the First Marquess of Hastings. In 1825 Henry Thoby Prinsep included an account of the Nepal war in his *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings*. More recent studies of the diplomatic and military aspects of the war include those by Pemble, Lamb and Singh all of which adopt a broad regional perspective. ¹ This paper builds on these authors’ earlier work by focusing at a more local level on the role of Captain Barré Latter (1777-1822), the British officer who had the prime responsibility for frontline diplomatic contacts with Sikkim.

The paper is primarily based on two sets of archival sources. The first and most important consists of the official correspondence from the India Office archives, now held at the British Library in London. The second set of sources, which shed light on Latter’s religious views, is a series of letters in the Church Missionary Society archive at the University of Birmingham. A definitive history of Sikkim’s role in the Nepal war will require a more detailed comparison of British, Sikkimese, Nepalese, Tibetan and Chinese sources: it is hoped that the paper will serve as a step in this direction.

The paper begins by introducing the wider geopolitical context and Latter’s personal background, before examining his involvement in the war in greater detail. It has two main themes. The first is Latter’s personal contribution to local and regional diplomacy during and after the war. The second concerns his religious views and his indirect contribution to Tibetan linguistic research. Alex McKay’s study of the Indian Political Service has highlighted the importance of the ‘Frontier Cadre’ in twentieth century Tibet.² In a similar vein this paper points to the important role played by a key frontier official on the borders of Sikkim in the early nineteenth century.

**Himalayan geopolitics**

In the second half of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth, the expansion of the East India Company in northern India was matched by that of another rising regional power: the House of Gorkha. The Gorkha ruler Prithvinarayan (1723-1775) began the process—continued by his successors—whereby the Gorkhas established control first of the Kathmandu Valley in 1769, then of what is now eastern Nepal in the 1770s and 1780s,³ followed by Kumaon, Garhwal, and westward as far
as the Sutlej by the early 1800s. In 1825 Prinsep noted that the expansion of the House of Gorkha had been compared—“and not inaptly”—to the policy “which had gained for us the empire of Hindoostan.” He concluded that war between the Company and Nepal had been inevitable before Moira had even set foot in India.

British officialdom had two main concerns in relation to Nepal. The first was already apparent during the time of Warren Hastings (1732-1818), who served as Governor-General from 1773-1785. The Gorkha conquest of Kathmandu had cut off what appeared to be a promising trade route from India to Tibet, and possibly ultimately to China: it was in that context that Hastings in 1774 sent George Bogle (1747-1781) via Bhutan to Tibet in order to make contact with the Panchen Lama. The second concerned the boundaries—which were often overlapping or poorly delineated—between the hill states conquered by the Gorkhas and the Indian plains which were controlled by the British. The immediate cause of the 1814-1816 war was a boundary dispute in northern Bihar.

At the outset of the war, Moira decided on a four-pronged attack on Nepal. The key military commanders were four Major-Generals: David Ochterlony in the far west; Rollo Gillespie in Dehra Dun and Garhwal; John Sullivan Wood who was to advance north from Gorakhpur; and Bennet Marley who was to capture Makwanpur and ultimately Kathmandu.

At the same time, Moira also had much wider strategic concerns, the most important of which was to avoid giving offence to China. In 1788 and again in 1792 the Gorkhas had invaded Tibet, only to be defeated by military reinforcements from China. The outcomes of these two wars were first that Nepal undertook to send a tribute mission to Beijing every five years, and secondly that the Manchus consolidated their control over Tibet, effectively closing off any British hopes of expanding their economic links or building up stronger diplomatic connections in that quarter. Nevertheless, Moira wanted to avoid antagonising China for fear of jeopardising Britain’s growing trading interests in Canton. He wished to make clear to both China and Tibet that the war was solely a response to what he portrayed as Nepalese provocation, and did not presage a further British attack north of the Himalaya.

Moira’s combined military and diplomatic interests therefore caused him to look to the north-east as well as to the main theatres of military operations along Nepal’s southern border. He did not intend the north-east to be the scene of a major offensive. However, at a minimum, he expected the Company’s local forces to protect the frontier and—if possible—to stage diversionary attacks. At the same time, he hoped that it might be possible to send a message to Tibet and ultimately to China—in the first instance via Sikkim or Bhutan—to explain British intentions during the war.

It was in this context that he turned to the two senior British officials in northern Bengal on the spot: Captain Barré Latter, the regional military commander, and David Scott, the magistrate at Rangpur. Of the two, it was Latter who came to play the more prominent role in British relations with Sikkim.

**Personal background**

Barré Richard William Latter—to give him his full name—came from what appears to be a solid English professional background. He was born on 22 July 1777, the son of Thomas Latter of Harley Street, London, and baptized in Marylebone on 5 September. According to his niece, the family surname may have been of French origin, deriving from ‘Laterre’. This French connection may explain his unusual first name.
In January 1788 Latter was admitted to Rugby School, an establishment which was later to become celebrated as the scene of Thomas Hughes’ classic *Tom Brown’s Schooldays* (1857). A glance at the school register for his year of entry shows that the majority of his classmates became either clergymen or army officers. Latter himself was admitted to Lincoln’s Inn in 1791, suggesting that he had at first intended to embark on a career in the law. However, in 1795 he signed up as an army cadet, and arrived in India on 12 February 1797, still aged only 19. His older brother Francis (1776-1808), and younger brother Robert James (1780-1850), likewise served in the Bengal Army. Robert James lived longest and achieved the most senior position, retiring with the rank of General.

Barré Latter was promoted to the rank of Captain in November 1805, and served successively in Bundelkhand, Mathura, Rewari and Delhi before being appointed to the command of the Rangpur Local Battalion in September 1813. His headquarters was at Titalia, to the north of Rangpur and close to the boundaries of Gorkha-controlled territory. He was to remain in this post until his death in 1822 apart from a short period on leave in Mauritius. It seems that he never returned to Britain after his first arrival in India. In this he was representative of his generation. Between 1796 and 1820 only 201 officers retired to Europe on pension, while 1,243 were killed or died in service.

In January 1814 Latter married Julia Ann Jeffreys, who likewise came from a family of middle class professionals. She was one of 16 children born to Rev. Richard Jeffreys (1762-1830) who between 1803 and 1811 had spent part of his career as an East India Company Chaplain in Calcutta. Two of her brothers, Edward (1789-1863) and Francis (1809-1839), served in the Bengal Army: Edward was with Latter in the Rangpur Local Battalion between 1814 and 1820.

By the outbreak of the Nepal war in late 1814, Latter was therefore 37 years old, an experienced military officer who was ready for further responsibilities.

**Instructions from Calcutta**

On 26 November 1814, John Adam (1779-1825), the Secretary to the Government, wrote to Latter and Scott to give them their instructions. Adam was to remain both men’s main point of contact in Calcutta, and himself reported directly to Moira. The lines of communication up the hierarchy to the Governor-General were therefore remarkably short.

Adam’s instructions are important both as a summary of British strategy in the north-east and for what they reveal about the extent—and the limitations—of British knowledge of the Himalayan border regions. At the outset of the war the lack of precise intelligence even on matters such as alternative routes to Kathmandu was a significant obstacle to British military planning.

Latter’s prime role was to act as military commander in charge of the frontier regions east of the river Kosi. At a minimum, he was expected to hold the frontier: if possible he was to foment diversionary attacks. With this in mind, Adam instructed Latter to communicate with the Kirantis in eastern Nepal, parts of which had been ruled by the Rajahs of Makwanpur before the Gorkha invasion. His task was “to excite them to exertion in the cause of their ancient line of Princes” so that they would cooperate with the British in the expulsion of the Gorkhas.

At the same time, Adam also wrote a more detailed set of instructions to Scott concerning diplomatic relations with Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. Scott’s briefing included an extract from a report on Sikkim prepared for the government by Dr Francis Buchanan Hamilton (1762-1829). The report was afterwards published in
slightly different form in the author’s *Account of the Kingdom of Nepal* (1819), and the information that it contained on Sikkim was itself largely based on a second-hand account from a lama who had fled to Purnea in British India following the Gorkha invasion as well as “natives of the Company’s territory, who had visited the lower parts of Sikkim”. It includes an outline history of Gorkha attacks on Sikkim from 1782 onwards and subsequent Sikkimese resistance with intermittent assistance from Bhutan and Tibet.

At the time when Buchanan was writing, the Rajah of Sikkim (gTsug phud rnam rgyal, 1785-1863) was in unchallenged possession of ‘Gandhauk’ (Gangtok), but had lost much of his territory to the south and west. These lands were under the overall control of the Gorkhas but administered by a Lepcha “Governor or Collector… called Yukangta, and by the Bengalese, Angriya.” Scott was therefore instructed to propose that the Rajah ally himself with the British with a view to recovering the “possessions of his ancestors.” This approach might create a military diversion, while at the same time serving a wider diplomatic purpose:

The Princes of Sikkim, being closely connected with the Lamas of Lassa and Bootan, their restoration to their ancient territory would, no doubt, be highly acceptable to the authorities in those countries, and induce them to regard our proceedings with satisfaction. With respect to Lassa, in particular, it will be advisable to conciliate the Government, as a means of evincing to the Chinese, whose power is predominant there, the moderation of our views, and to shew that they are directed to no objects of aggrandizement in that quarter.

With the same diplomatic objectives in mind Adam instructed Scott to “open a channel of communication with the administration of Lassa” as well as with Bhutan. This communication should take the form of “the deputation of a decent person to each court, furnished with the necessary information, and known at the same time to proceed from an English authority” rather than “the parade of a formal mission.”

In the event the Rajah of Sikkim took the initiative to contact Latter direct and, although Scott succeeded in sending a Bengali emissary, Kishen Kant Bose, to Bhutan, he was not allowed to proceed to Tibet. It was therefore Latter rather than Scott who was to be the main point of contact with Sikkim as well as the Kirantis and, ultimately, Tibet.

**The alliance with Sikkim in the 1814-1815 campaign**

Latter’s dispatches in the first few weeks of the war reflect a sense of urgency. Major-General Marley, who was supposed to lead the advance on Makwanpur and Kathmandu, proved to be incompetent. The result of the stalling of Marley’s campaign was that the Gorkhas were able to deploy more troops to the east, and Latter feared that an attack on his own area was imminent.

In January 1815 Latter gave an initial assessment of the prospects for inciting a rebellion among the Kirantis: he judged that they were unlikely to respond until the British armies had “met with some signal success”, and that “any injudicious attempt to excite them to an insurrection until we are prepared to support them, might be attended with the most melancholy consequences.” The main reason was the “dreadful punishments which the Goorka Government inflicts upon its subjects whose fidelity is doubted.” He noted that Subhan Singh, the former Dewan (minister) of one of the states conquered by the Gorkhas, had entered into a correspondence with the Kirantis only a few years previously. According to his account, the Gorkhas had put as many as 500 Kirantis to death by way of reprisal.
By contrast the prospects for an alliance with Sikkim looked much more favourable. On 8 January Latter wrote to Lt-Colonel Fagan, the Adjutant-General, reporting that the Rajah had already contacted him and that the Sikkimese had agreed in principle to attack the fort of Nagari, to the north of Titalia. In early February he received a further letter from the Rajah. The Rajah was willing to send five Kazis and his Dewan with 1,500 men: “Make yourself master of the Maddies, or low country, and I will conquer the hilly part.” The main question was when the Sikkimese were to launch their attack: they were reluctant to do so before the British had begun their offensive on Nepal’s southern borders in earnest.

On 4 February Latter wrote to Marley reporting that the Gorkhas had increased the number of troops near Titalia adding that his report was far from being based on mere hearsay:

…our Posts are within Sight of the Enemy so that they see their fires by night and regularly hear them firing at Exercise Morning and Evening.

Latter did not know it, but the first exchange of fire had already taken place as he was writing. On the night of 3 February a party of Gorkha troops had launched a surprise night-time attack on a detachment led by one of Latter’s junior officers, Lieutenant William Whiting Foord (1790-1849) at Moodwanny. Foord’s troops managed to repulse the Gorkhas but, having run out of ammunition, decided to retreat. This incident reinforced Latter’s view that it was essential to retain a detachment of troops led by a Lieutenant Cock which otherwise would have been sent to reinforce Marley. For the same reason, he at that point felt unable to afford any immediate assistance to the Rajah of Sikkim in his attempt upon Nagari without “eminently endangering the whole of this frontier.”

Latter again justified his decision to detain Cock’s detachment in a despatch written the following month, and this is revealing for the insight that it gives to his view of the Company’s relationship with Sikkim. The letter refers to the Gorkhas’ “barbarous treatment… of those who manifested a disposition to throw off their Yoke”, and notes that this reportedly included “the mutilation of the inhabitants of whole villages”. Latter argued that a reduction in the number of British troops would leave the Rajah over-exposed to the Gorkha forces, and that this would amount to a breach of promise.

It was with a knowledge of the character of the Gorkha Government that the Sikkim Rajah offered his assistance & cordially entered into our views, but in so doing the most earnest and impressive entreaties were made that they might not be deceived, as the most inevitable destruction would attend them if they were. I assured them that as far as I was individually concerned they never should be, that as long as the negociation [sic] was entrusted to me, I should be guided in my conduct towards them by the principles which were inherent in the Christian character, and that no British Government would ever require one of its officers to deviate from these principles… I consider myself, as the ostensible agent in the negociation to have pledged the faith of the British Government as much as if a regular Treaty had been entered into.

Fortunately, Latter was able to regain the military initiative by invading the eastern Morang region and then launching a concerted attack on a Gorkha post at Bansgaon, just north of Titalia: the Gorkhas withdrew without a fight. He then encouraged the Rajah of Sikkim to besiege the Gorkha fort at Nagari. However, the Sikkimese were unable to capture it before the summer rains ended the campaign season.
Gorkha troops recaptured part of the Morang shortly after the beginning of the rains, and in early May 1815 Latter withdrew to Calcutta, suffering from an “extreme indisposition”, whereupon he entrusted “all affairs of a civil nature”—including correspondence with Sikkim—to Scott. The overall outcome of the 1814-1815 campaign was therefore something of a stalemate.

The second campaign, 1815-1816

Latter returned from Calcutta to Titalia in mid-December 1815. By this time the Treaty of Segauli between the Company and Nepal had been signed, but not yet ratified in Kathmandu. His immediate task was therefore to ensure that his troops and their Sikkimese allies remained on the alert, pending a clarification of the political situation.

Latter summarised the situation in the north-east in two letters to Adam written on 16 and 19 December. The Nepalese had resumed occupation of the Morang, but might be easily dislodged, depending on the outcome of ongoing political negotiations with Kathmandu. Meanwhile, there had been a misunderstanding with the Rajah of Sikkim because the Sub-Assistant Commissary-General had sent a message seeking to procure a number of hill porters. The message had been conveyed in the “Sepahee language” (‘sepoy language’—presumably Urdu): the Rajah’s Kazis (ministers) had understood it to be a call to arms and had sent 250 men to Titalia. At the same time, the Eck Chuckra Kazi, the nephew of the Rajah’s Dewan, had advanced to a place called Selim, south-east of Nagari. Latter explained the misunderstanding and sent the men back together with fifty muskets and a supply of ammunition, as well as Rs 250 for expenses. He also sent letters to the Rajah written in the “Sepahee” and Bengali languages expressing appreciation for his support.

On 30 December, Latter reported a meeting with the Eck Chuckra Kazi where he briefed him on the latest developments concerning the draft Treaty of Segauli. He noted that the Kazi had:

… expressed great apprehension at being exposed to the implacable enmity of the Gorkhas, which the part they had taken in the present contest would tend to exasperate, and from the notorious disregard which the Nepaulese paid to the faith of all treaties, he was convinced that they would not abide by their engagements.

Latter assured him that the Sikkim Rajah “was included in the treaty as the friend and ally of the British Government”, and that in future any disputes between him and the Nepal government would be referred to the Governor-General. He added that, once the details were confirmed, he would inform the Rajah about the possible restoration of Sikkimese territory from the Gorkhas. The Kazi was accompanied by about 1,200 armed troops and “several Lama priests”. Latter thought it advisable to give the Kazi Rs 1,000 towards their subsistence: he also gave a small gun to the Kazi himself, while sending a double-barrelled gun as a gift to the Rajah.

In a letter sent on 13 January 1816, Adam approved Latter’s actions. He noted the continuing doubts as to Nepal’s willingness to ratify the Treaty of Segauli, but confirmed the government’s intention to transfer the forts and territories east of the river Mechi to Sikkim. The government’s provisional plan was to retain control of the lowland territory east of the Mechi as far as the hills, but this was subject to further discussion with Latter and Scott.

In February fighting did resume in the north-east. On 18 February Latter reported that the Eck Chuckra Kazi had surprised a party of 50 Gorkha soldiers at...
“Phok-Gawn” in the hills to the west of Nagari and seized the grain stored there. The following day he reported that the Kazi had been reinforced by 1,500 men under the command of his uncle, and that firing had been heard in the direction of Nagari.

On 25 February, Latter reported his first contact with a new Sikkimese political leader:

I have great satisfaction in stating, that I yesterday received a communication for the first time from Deboo Tucka the Booteah Kajee who is at present stationed with a detachment of Troops at a place called Manichooka near a mountain named Singitilah six days’ journey north-west of Naggree. It appears that this Kajee possesses considerable influence, having the entire control of the Booteahs & Limboos in the Siccim Rajah’s service.

Latter expressed the hope that the Bhotia Kazi would be able to instigate a general uprising east of the Kosi. He therefore promised assistance to any of his followers who would take up arms against the Gorkhas and included a present of Rs 500 “to be distributed amongst such Limboos as might be induced to quit the Goorkha army”. He also sent ten stand of arms with the promise of more to come.

In a further meeting with Eck Chuckra Kazi at the end of February Latter reported that he had held out the prospects of the Sikkim Rajah recovering the whole of his dominions as far as the Kosi river, and pointed out the advantages which might be derived by bringing over the different tribes of Kirantis. The Kazi replied that the Kirantis were not likely to quit the Nepal army as long as the Gorkhas remained in possession of Nagari. He urged on Latter the necessity of attacking Nagari, but Latter pointed out that porters and pack animals had already been discharged, and it was too late in the season to collect them again. Meanwhile, he encouraged the Kazi to advance to “Elam and Phae-Phae, two districts situated in the hills between the Mitchie and the Koose on the route to Cheinpore.”

In the same despatch Latter reported receiving a letter from “Lama Nadhuep, who is the chief superintendent and director of all the monasteries, and has the privilege of using a red seal”. The Lama expressed his enmity against the Gorkhas and trusted that their power “would be completely annihilated”.

Although he had decided it was too late to launch a full-scale assault on Nagari, Latter nevertheless sent two letters to Jayanta Khatri, the Gorkha commander, inviting him to surrender and come over to the British camp. Jayanta Khatri sent a reply saying that he and his followers were faithful to their sovereign and ready to sacrifice their lives in the discharge of their duty. However, on 13 March Latter received a letter from Major General Ochterlony saying that Nepal and the Company had finally agreed to peace terms, and Jayanta Khatri’s sacrifice proved not to be necessary.

Following further negotiations, Jayanta Khatri and his company of about a hundred men finally withdrew from Nagari with their colours and music at the pre-arranged auspicious hour of 11 am on 14 April. Latter decided to keep a small detachment of Company troops at Nagari for the time being, pending a final decision on the transfer of the surrounding territory to the Rajah of Sikkim.

Under Article 3 of the Treaty of Segauli, Nepal ceded to the Company all the lowland area between the rivers Mechi and Testa (i.e. the eastern Morang) as well as the highland areas east of the river Mechi, including the fort and lands of Nagari. In principle, some or all of this territory was to be transferred to the Rajah of Sikkim as a reward for his support during the war. However, the date and details of the transfer had yet to be settled.
Further negotiations were delayed first by the onset of the hot season, when Sikkimese messengers were reluctant to travel to the plains because of the risk of disease, and secondly by a diplomatic alarm over possible Chinese intervention via Tibet. As will be seen, the Rajah of Sikkim—communicating via Latter—was to play a major role in assisting British communication with the Chinese, and in helping defuse the crisis.

**Diplomatic contacts via Sikkim with China and Tibet**

From the outset, one of Lord Moira’s main concerns had been the possibility that the war with Nepal might lead to a dispute with China, thus imperilling Britain’s growing trading interests in East Asia.

In October 1814, Ahmed Ali, a Kashmiri merchant based in Patna reported that the Rajah of Nepal had sent a letter to the Emperor of China appealing for “men and treasure to wage war against the Feringees.” During the war itself, there was no further news from China. However, in February 1816 the Emperor decided to send a small military force under the command of Sai-Ch’ung-a, a senior Manchu official based in Sichuan, to report on the latest developments in Tibet and Nepal.

News of Sai-Ch’ung-a’s arrival in Tibet first reached the British via Sikkim in June 1816 when the Rajah wrote to Latter reporting forwarding a letter from the ‘Chun Maharajah’ (i.e. the Emperor). The letter was written in the name of Sai-Ch’ung-a and the two Manchu Ambans (commissioners) in Lhasa. It reported that the Rajah of Gorkha had written to the Ambans claiming that the British had asked the Nepal and Sikkim Rajahs to grant them free passage through their territories “when it would be seen what would happen”. The British supposedly had also proposed that the two Rajahs of Gorkha and Sikkim “should pay to them the Tribute which they now pay to China.” However, the letter from Sai-Ch’ung-a expressed scepticism over the Gorkhas’ report:

> Such absurd measures as those alluded to appear quite inconsistent with the usual wisdom of the English. It is probable that they never made the declaration imputed to them.

Nevertheless, he requested the Governor-General to send a message as soon as possible “stating whether or not the English really made the absurd propositions imputed to them.”

Sai-Ch’ung-a’s presence in Tibet caused even more concern in Kathmandu than in Calcutta. Having themselves called for the Emperor’s assistance, the Gorkhas were afraid that they would face Chinese retribution now that they had already lost the war with the Company. The letters from the Chinese to the Gorkha court, which were intercepted in Kathmandu by Lieutenant Boileau (a member of the British Resident’s staff), no doubt reinforced their concerns:

> Should the English disprove their having advanced what you have said to have proceeded from them, you will have fabricated falsehoods of importance and have brought down on yourselves the anger of the King. In this case Goorkha beware! You will receive the punishment that would otherwise be inflicted on the English.

At the same time the Nepalese hoped that the Chinese would use their diplomatic influence in their favour, notably by requesting the British to remove their Resident from Kathmandu, thus mitigating one of the more disagreeable outcomes of the war.
The British considered the possibility of sending an official from the Kathmandu Resident’s staff to Tibet to meet Sai-Ch’ung-a in person, but eventually decided against it. Sikkim therefore remained the main channel of communication. In July, Adam confirmed Latter’s orders to continue to maintain “a friendly intercourse with the Lama of Lhasa through the Rajah of Sikkim”. In early August the Governor-General drafted an official reply to the letter from Sai-Ch’ung-a and the Ambans, and asked Latter to forward it via Sikkim.

On 19 August Latter reported that two Chinese officials had arrived at the Rajah of Sikkim’s court earlier in the month, together with 17 followers. The Rajah had “gained over these men to his interest and sent them back to Lassa completely satisfied after giving them various presents.” He noted that the Rajah had sent a “confidential person” to Lhasa as soon as he had heard of the approach of a Chinese force, and believed that the fact that Sai-Ch’ung-a’s original letter was couched in moderate terms was a result of Sikkimese influence. Latter requested the Rajah to send further “confidential people” to Lhasa, and furnished him with Rs 1,000 to that purpose.

On 13 September Latter reported further news from Lhasa via Sikkim: it seems that the Gorkha envoys to Sai-ch’ung-a had been put under restraint and were now in close confinement. He attributed this development to the “Lama at Lassa”, and again noted that the “Sikhem Rajah’s influence has been most successfully exerted throughout the whole negotiation.”

Further news of a similar nature continued to filter through from Tibet over the following two months. On 30 October, Latter received a letter from the Chinese authorities stating that the Vizier was “perfectly satisfied” with the British response. On 8 November Moira recorded that Sai-ch’ung-a’s letter and Latter’s accompanying dispatch had just been received in Calcutta. Sai-ch’ung-a’s own knowledge of the “lying character of the Gorkhas disposed him to yield implicit confidence to all we advanced on the subject”, and the Rajah of Sikkim “had borne testimony to the manner in which the war was forced upon us. Sai-ch’ung-a now desired it to be understood that “all was well between the Chinese and the English”.

In the accompanying letter the Rajah said that he wished to be enrolled as “a dependent on the British Government”. Moira was delighted with this outcome. In his diary, he pointed out that it could never have been achieved by force of arms, because of the difficulty of the terrain, and expressed the hope that the British relationship with Sikkim would promote future communications “by way of Thibet with Pekin”.

The treaty negotiations with Sikkim

Latter was concerned that the proposed transfer to Sikkim of territory surrendered by Nepal under the terms of the Treaty of Segauli should not be seen as a concession to Chinese pressure, and this was one of the sources of delay. A second factor was that the British had yet to decide precisely which territories should be transferred. In the course of 1816 the government secretariat in Calcutta exchanged a series of letters with Latter and Scott discussing this issue.

The government’s original view was that the British should annex the fertile lowland areas of the Eastern Morang as well as “the pass of Nuggercote leading to the Hills”. However, Latter—supported by Scott—took a different view. Latter pointed to the political benefits of supporting the Rajah:

The influence which our connection with the Sikhem Rajah must give us over the other Hill tribes will prove of the utmost importance in the event of any future War
with the Nepalese and this influence when properly exerted must tend greatly to the moral improvement of numerous tribes at present scarcely known to us even by name.

At the same time, he reminded Calcutta that the Rajah had supported the British in the war not only out of hatred for the Gorkhas, but also because he hoped to regain lost territory. He needed to be able to control a portion of the much more fertile lowlands if he were to gain the full economic benefits of his acquisitions. As Latter explained:

The Cession of the Hill Country without the annexation of some of the lowland will not accomplish this object and it is very doubtful whether he would be any gainer by the acquisition unless allowed to hold land which will enable him to subsist the Garrisons he must maintain for the protection of the Passes. 73

A further factor, as Scott pointed out, was the distance of the lands in question from the main administrative centres of northern Bengal, which in turn would make it harder to govern them and administer justice effectively.74 It was therefore decided to grant the whole of the Eastern Morang to the Rajah.75 However, whereas the Rajah was to hold the highlands in full sovereignty, Latter argued that he should hold the lowland areas “as a feudatory or tributary of the British government”, meaning that the Company’s rights to the lands should not be relinquished altogether. 76

This distinction meant that the transfer took place in two stages. The first stage took place on 10 February 1817 when Latter signed the Treaty of Titalia on behalf of the Company while Nazir Chaina Tenjin (sPyi gnyer bstan ’dzin), Macha Teinbah (Ma chen bstan pa) and Lama Duchim Longdoo (probably bDe chen dbang ’dus) signed on behalf of the Rajah.77 Article 1 made over to the Rajah and his heirs “all the hilly or mountainous country situated to the eastward of the Mechi River and to the westward of the Teesta River” which had formerly been occupied by the Gorkhas. Under Article 2, the Rajah engaged to abstain from any acts of aggression or hostility against Nepal or any other state. Article 3 committed the Rajah to refer any disputes with Nepal or any other neighbouring state to British arbitration. The other provisions of the treaty included promises by the Rajah to: join with the British in the case of any military conflict in the hills; refuse permission to any European or North American to reside in Sikkim without the consent of the English government; refuse protection to any “defaulters of revenue or other delinquents” when demanded by the British government; and to “afford protection to merchants and traders from the Company’s provinces.”

The second stage was completed on 7 April 1817 when the Company granted the Rajah a sanad concerning the low land situated east of the Mechi river, and westward of the Mahananda. 78 The terms of the sanad made clear that the Rajah would hold the territory “as a feudatory, or as acknowledging the supremacy of the British Government over such lands.” With that, the post-war territorial negotiations were now complete.

Latter’s sponsorship of FCG Schroeter’s Tibetan research

While Latter was still engaged in the diplomatic negotiations with Sikkim, China and Tibet, he had already begun to turn his attention to religious matters. His correspondence on these issues sheds light both on another facet of his character, and on the early stages of European linguistic research in the Himalayan region.
In his personal beliefs, Latter was a keen Evangelical Christian, and in the summer of 1816 he wrote to the Calcutta Corresponding committee of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) pointing to the opportunities for missionary work:

Owing to a particular chain of events it has so occurred that I have obtained an uncommon degree of influence over a number of Tribes hitherto unknown to us, but who possess a degree of knowledge that has surprised me. Now I am desirous that this influence should be directed in affording Facilities to the Spread of the Gospel amongst them…

Latter therefore recommended that the CMS should send a missionary to Titalia, adding that they should do so while he himself was still in post:

It cannot be expected that all Commanding Officers should feel so interested in the Cause as I do, and it is not likely that any one will again be vested with the same authority, for the Duties entrusted to me have been of a military, civil and political nature. It is in this last respect that I have been able to do so much.

He further pointed out the opportunities for linguistic research, guided by divine providence:

The advantages to be expected from having a Missionary here are that he will be enabled to become acquainted with Languages hitherto unknown but current amongst extensive Nations who have Presses for Printing, which alone affords a great facility for circulating the Scriptures. Besides our first communication with them will, in some degree, be sanctified, and we may therefore expect that the Blessing of God will attend an Intercourse with these Nations.

The committee duly responded by sending a young German missionary, Frederic Christian Gotthelf Schroeter, who had just arrived in Calcutta. Schroeter reached Titalia in late October 1816, and at once embarked on the study of Tibetan.

Encouraged by Schroeter’s initial progress, Latter wrote a further letter to the Calcutta committee in June 1817:

I am in great hopes that a very extensive field will soon be open to us for circulating the Scriptures. If it can once be ascertained that they are desirous of receiving them, our supplying them with the Word of God can never be objected to. As printing is known throughout Thibet in the same manner as it is in China, we may hope if the Scriptures are sought after by the inhabitants that they will multiply copies themselves and this ought to be an inducement with us to ascertain as speedily as possible the language in which the version of the Scriptures will be most generally acceptable.

In October 1817, despite Latter’s optimistic assessment, the Calcutta committee decided to withdraw Schroeter from Titalia and post him to Burdwan, some 40 miles north-east of Calcutta. However, Latter felt so strongly about the importance of Schroeter’s work that he arranged for the British authorities to employ him directly at a salary of Rs 200 a month. Schroeter therefore returned to Titalia to resume his work under Latter’s direct sponsorship.

Latter provided further assistance by searching for texts that might assist Schroeter in his work, and these included a manuscript Italian-Tibetan dictionary prepared by the Capuchin missionary Orazio della Penna in Tibet during the eighteenth century as well as a number of Tibetan works. However, Schroeter died
in July 1820 before his work could be completed, and Latter himself died in September 1822.

Since Schroeter had been paid a government salary, the British authorities laid claim to his draft dictionary, and asked the Baptist missionary William Carey (1761-1834) for advice on what to do with the manuscript. Carey and his younger colleague John Clark Marshman (1794-1877) edited and published it in Serampore as the *Dictionary of the Bhotanta, or Boutan Language* in 1826. This was the first Tibetan-English dictionary to be printed. However, it was quickly superseded by Alexander Csoma de Körös’s Tibetan-English dictionary which appeared only eight years later in 1834. As a result, the Serampore dictionary’s status as a landmark in Western studies of Tibetan—and Latter’s role as a sponsor of part of the work that went into it—have not achieved the recognition that they deserve.  

**Conclusion**

Latter’s engagement with Sikkim marked both the beginning and a highpoint in Anglo-Sikkimese relations. Arguably this highpoint was primarily due to the geopolitical circumstances: both sides had a shared interest in joining forces against the Gorkhas. British support enabled Sikkim to regain lost territory, and guaranteed the kingdom’s survival. Meanwhile, the Company benefited not just by virtue of Sikkim’s relatively small-scale military assistance, but also because it gained a valuable intermediary in its sensitive relationship with China and Tibet.

While the political environment may have been favourable in any case, Latter’s personal diplomacy played an essential part in building the relationship. Latter was representative of his time and place in that there is nothing in his surviving correspondence to suggest any doubt as to the overall legitimacy of British interests. Nevertheless, he showed more diplomatic sensitivity than many of his contemporaries in that he always sought to understand Sikkimese interests, as well as to promote the British cause.

As has been seen, examples include his insistence in March 1815 on keeping sufficient numbers of British troops in the north-east to protect the Rajah of Sikkim from a possible Gorkha counter-attack, as well as his arguments in 1816 in favour of transferring the Eastern Morang to the Rajah rather than incorporating it within British India. In a similar vein, Latter presented a consistently favourable view of the Sikkimese to his superiors. One instance is his positive—albeit somewhat patronising—observation in a dispatch of December 1815 that his Sikkimese interlocutors had always displayed “ability and sound judgement” that this proved that “their nation, though hitherto scarcely known to Europeans, does not rank low in the scale of intellectual attainment…”

The Sikkimese apparently reciprocated with a high degree of personal trust. For example, in a letter written in early 1816, the Rajah appealed to the Governor-General:

> As long as the boundary is not laid down definitely, I pray that the Major Saheb who represents the British Government may not be removed or transferred elsewhere. If this is not done, then your Excellency is aware of the various subterfuges that the Gurkhas might employ to defraud us.

As noted above, Latter had written in March 1815 that his conduct towards Sikkim would be guided “by the principles which were inherent in the Christian character.” In his case, it appears that this statement was more than a mere piece of rhetoric. The
Evangelical ethos included a strong sense of public duty and humanitarian concern—as expressed in the early nineteenth century campaign against the trans-Atlantic slave trade—which extended beyond narrow personal or even national interests. In retrospect, Latter’s hopes for the spontaneous diffusion of the Christian scriptures through indigenous printing presses may sound naïve. However, they at least reflected a sense of openness and even esteem for his local counterparts. In all these respects, Latter’s diplomacy towards Sikkim presents a favourable contrast with the much sourer and more arrogant approach adopted by his mid-nineteenth century successors.

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**Secondary sources**


Endnotes

1 See Pemble (1971), Lamb (1986) and Singh (1988).
2 McKay (1997).
4 On Bogle, see in particular Lamb (2002).
5 For a recent review of the events leading to the war, see Michael (1999).
6 For the details of the military campaign see Pemble (1971).
7 For Scott’s background and life history, see in particular White (1832) and Barooah (1970).
8 Hodson (1946), vol.3, p.18. Except where otherwise stated, Hodson is the source for the following biographical details of Latter and his brothers.
9 Baillie (1870), p. 15.
11 Also spelt ‘Titalya’, and now ‘Tetulia’. Today, it is the northernmost town of Bangladesh.
14 Hodson (1928), vol.2, p. 548. The India connection continued to the next generation. Captain Thomas Latter (1816-1853), the son of Barré and Julia Ann, was an East India Company army officer and the author of the first Burmese grammar in English.
17 PRNW, pp. 269-70; OIOC H/646.
19 This was the Scottish doctor and botanist Francis Buchanan Hamilton (1762-1829). He adopted the surname ‘Hamilton’ after inheriting his mother’s estate in 1815.
20 Buchanan Hamilton (1819), pp. 2-3.
21 Following contemporary British usage in archives, I refer to the ‘Rajah’ rather than the ‘Chos rgyal’.
22 Extract from a report from Dr Buchanan, PRNW, p. 268.
23 Adam to Scott, 26 November 1814, PRNW, p. 266.
24 Ibid., pp. 266-7.
25 Kishen Kant Bose (Krishnakanta Basu) wrote an ‘Account of Bengal’, which was translated from Bengali into English by David Scott, and eventually published in 1865 in a collection of papers on Political Missions to Bhutan. See Bray 2009-2010.
26 For the failures of Marley’s campaign see Pemble (1971), pp. 210-47. Marley eventually abandoned his command on 10 February and was replaced by Major-General George Wood.


28 Latter to Adam, Titalia, 11 January 1815. PRNW, pp. 408-9.

29 Ibid. Pradhan (1991, p.137) notes that a Kiranti uprising against the Gorkhas in 1791-1792 had been repressed with great severity, although Gorkha policy towards the Kirantis had subsequently been more conciliatory.


31 Latter to Adam, Titalia, 4 February 1815. PRNW, pp. 428-30.

32 Latter to Marley, Titalia, 4 May 1815, OIOC H/649, p. 528

33 Latter to Gordon, Titalia, 6 February 1815, OIOC H/649, p. 557. For Foord’s biographical details see: Hodson Vol 2 (1928), p. 198. I have not been able to identify the modern name of Moodwanny

34 Latter to Marley, Titalia, 4 February 1815, OIOC H/649, p. 528.

35 Latter to Adam, Titalia, 4 February, PRNW, p. 429.


39 Latter to Adam, Titalia, 16 December 1815, PRNW, pp. 922-3.

40 Latter to Adam, Titalia, 19 December 1815, PRNW, pp. 923-4.

41 Saul Mullard suggests that ‘Eck Chuckra’ may be based on a Nepali or Hindi rendering of this person’s name: his precise identity remains uncertain.

42 Latter to Adam, Titalia, 30 December 1815, PRNW, pp. 924-5.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Adam to Latter, 13 January 1816, PRNW, pp. 926-8.

46 Pema Wangchuk suggests that this is the place known on present-day maps as ‘Phuaka’ on the approach to Sikkim from Chiwa Bhanjyang.

47 Latter to Adam, Camp at Misacole, 18 February 1816, PRNW, p. 958.

48 Latter to Adam, Camp near Titalia, 25 February 1816. OIOC H 656, pp. 494-6. PRNW, pp. 959-60. ‘Singitilah’ must be the Singalila pass. The Kazi was probably a member of the Brag dkar pa family of g.Yang thang rdzong, with ‘Tucka’ a phonetic rendering of ‘Brag dkar’. On this family, see Mullard (2003).

49 Latter to Adam, Camp near Titalia, 2 March 1816, PRNW, pp. 960-1.

50 ‘Elam’ must refer to the town and district in western Nepal now known as ‘Ilam’.

51 Both Pema Wangchuk and Saul Mullard suggest that this lama is likely to have been the head of Pemayangtse. Mullard points out that ‘Nadhuep’ sounds like ‘gNas grub’ but that the head lama of the time was bDe chen dbang ’dus.

52 Latter to Jayanta Khatri, 7 & 11 March 1816. PRNW, p. 962. The commander’s name is give as ‘Gentikatri’ in the British records.

53 Jayanta Khatri to Latter, Nagari. PRNW, p. 963.


55 Latter to Adam, Titalia, 24 April 1816. OIOC F/4/551 13380, p. 52.

56 William Moorcroft to Adam, Poosah, 8 October 1814. PRNW, pp. 91-4. On Ahmed Ali, see Bray (2009).
57 Fu (1966), pp. 401-2 and pp. 618-9. This episode is also discussed in Rose (1971), pp. 75-95; Lamb (1986), pp. 34-8; Richardson (1973) and Manandhar (2004), p. 196 ff. British sources refer to Sai-Chung’a variously as ‘Sheo Chanchoon’, ‘Teo Chang Chan’ and ‘Thee Chanchan’.

58 Enclosure in a Dispatch from Captain Latter No. 16 to the Secret Department Dated 10th Received 17 June 1816. F/4/551 13382, p. 118.

59 Ibid., p. 123.

60 Ibid., p. 124.

61 Ibid., p. 125.


63 Adam to Latter, 13 July 1816, p. 129.

64 Letter from the Governor General to the Chinese Umbahs of Lassa, written 3 August 1816. OIOC F/4/551 13382, p. 156.


66 Ibid., p. 229. In this he was probably mistaken. The Emperor’s original instructions to Sai-ch’ung-a expressed great scepticism about the Gorkhalis’ claims. See Fu (1966), pp. 401-2.

67 Latter to Adam, Titalia 13 September 1816, OIOC F/4/552.

68 Latter to John Adam, Titalia, 30 October 1816. OIOC, F/4/552, p. 175.

69 Hastings (1858), Vol. 1, p. 268.

70 Ibid., p. 269.

71 Latter to Adam, 12 November 1816, OIOC. F/4/551/13380, pp. 143-4.

72 Extract from Political Letter from Bengal, 5 November 1816. OIOC. F/4/551/13380, p.6.

73 Latter to Adam, 23 March 1816. OIOC. F/4/551/13380, pp. 82-4.


75 For the history of the Eastern Morang, see Choudhury (1990/1991).


78 Aitchison 1933, Vol. XII, p. 60.

79 Minutes of the Church Missionary Society Calcutta Corresponding Committee, 9 September 1816. CMS archives CMS/B/OMS/C I1 E1/52. On the background to the CMS’s activities in the region, see Bray (2005, 2008).

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Latter to Thomas Thomason, Titalia, 26 June 1817, XCMS/BOMS/I1/CE/166B. The italics represent underlining in the original.

83 Richard Jeffreys, 20 July 1824. In Felix (1912), pp. 394-395. See also Hough (1839-1840), p. 304. Latter’s collection of Tibetan papers were eventually purchased by Rev W.H. Mills for the newly founded Bishop’s College Calcutta, the first Anglican seminary in India. Shastri (1915) lists a number of Tibetan works in the College’s library, and these may have been from Latter’s original collection. Such works were rare in Western collections during the early 19th century, and it must be regretted that they apparently were never put to scholarly use.

84 For a more detailed discussion of the history of the dictionary, see Bray (2008).

85 Latter to Adam, Titalia, 30 December 1815, PRNW, pp. 924-5.

86 OIOC, Mss Eur. E. 78. History of Sikkim, p. 109. According to Hodson (1946), Latter’s formal promotion to Major did not take place until September 1818. However, it is possible that he already held this rank on an acting basis during the war.